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Abstract
Several proposals for the reform of the euro area advocate the creation of a market
in synthetic securities backed by portfolios of sovereign bonds. Most debated are the
so-called European Safe Bonds or ESBies proposed by Brunnermeier, Langfield, Pagano,
Reis, Van Nieuwerburgh and Vayanos (2017). The potential benefits of ESBies and other
bond-backed securities hinge on the assertion that these products are really safe. In this
paper we provide a comprehensive quantitative study of the risks associated with ESBies
and related products, using an affine credit risk model with regime switching as vehicle
for our analysis. We discuss a recent proposal of Standard and Poors for the rating of
ESBies, we analyse the impact of model parameters and attachment points on the size and
the volatility of the credit spread of ESBies and we consider several approaches to assess
the market risk of ESBies. Moreover, we compare ESBies to synthetic securities created
by pooling the senior tranche of national bonds as suggested by Leandro and Zettelmeyer
(2019). The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the policy implications from our
analysis.
Keywords. European Safe Bonds, European monetary union, Securitization of credit risk,
Markov modulated affine models
1 Introduction
Synthetic securities backed by portfolios of sovereign bonds from the euro area have recently
been proposed as a tool to improve the stability of the European monetary union and to
increase the amount of safe assets in the euro area, see for instance Dombrovskis and Moscovici
(2017) or Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2018). The most debated proposal is due to Brunnermeier et al.
(2017), who advocate the creation of a market in so-called European Safe Bonds or ESBies.
In credit risk terminology, ESBies form the senior tranche of a CDO backed by a diversified
portfolio of sovereign bonds from all members of the euro area. According to Brunnermeier
et al. (2017), ESBies would be standardized and issued by tightly regulated private institutions
or by a public agency. The junior tranche of the underlying bond portfolio would be sold in
the form of European Junior Bonds (EJBies) to investors traditionally bearing default risk,
such as hedge funds or insurance companies.
Brunnermeier et al. (2017) argue that a liquid market in ESBies would enhance the stability
of the euro area in a number of ways: first, it would increase the supply of safe assets in
1We are grateful to Sam Langfield and to two anonymous referees for very useful comments and suggestions.
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the euro area; second, it would help to break the vicious circle between bank solvency and
the credit quality of sovereigns created by the fact that most euro area banks hold large
amounts of risky sovereign bonds of the nation state in which they reside; third, it might
reduce the distortions on bond markets caused by the flight-to-safety behavior of investors in
crisis times. Moreover, ESBies respect the no-bailout clause and their introduction would not
distort market discipline, as the agency issuing ESBies would buy these bonds at market prices
and as sovereigns would remain responsible for their own bonds, which exerts discipline on
borrowing decisions. Another important approach for creating a safe asset for the euro area
consistent with the no-bailout clause is to issue national sovereign bonds in several seniority
levels and to pool the bonds from the senior tranche, see for instance Leandro and Zettelmeyer
(2019). These products and ESBies are therefore different from eurobonds that are currently
discussed in the context of the Corona crisis. Eurobonds are jointly issued and guaranteed
by all euro area member states so that every member state is liable for the entire issuance.
Loosely speaking, ESBies are designed for improving the functioning of the euro area “in
normal times”, whereas eurobonds are crisis-intervention instruments.
The potential benefits of ESBies hinge on the assertion that these products are really safe.
To address this issue, Brunnermeier et al. (2017) carry out a simulation study in an one-
period mixture model where defaults are independent given the aggregate state of the euro
area economy. They find that, with reasonably high levels of subordination, the expected loss
of ESBies is comparable to that of triple-A rated bonds. However, their model is calibrated in
a fairly ad hoc manner. More importantly, Brunnermeier et al. (2017) do not study the market
risk of ESBies (the risk of a change in the market value of these products due to changes in
the credit quality of the underlying bonds or in the state of the euro area economy). Now, the
bad performance of many highly rated rated senior CDO tranches during the financial crisis
has shown that the market risk of such products can be substantial. Clearly, a high amount of
market risk is inappropriate for a safe asset intended to serve as collateral in security market
transactions, as an investment vehicle for money market funds or as a crisis-resilient store of
value on the balance sheet of banks. A thorough quantitative analysis of the risks associated
with ESBies is thus needed to assess if these securities can in fact perform the function of a
safe asset for the euro area. This is the aim of the present paper.
We propose to work in a novel dynamic credit risk model that captures salient features
of the credit spread dynamics of euro area member states and that is at the same time fairly
tractable. Such a model is a prerequisite for the analysis of the market risk associated with
ESBies. In mathematical terms, we consider a reduced-form model with conditionally indepen-
dent default times; the hazard rate or default intensity of the different obligors is modelled by
CIR-type processes whose mean-reversion level is a function of a common finite state Markov
chain. Considering a Markov modulated mean-reversion level permits us to model different
regimes, such as a crisis regime where the default intensity of all sovereigns is high and an
expansionary regime where all default intensities are low. This generates default dependence
in a natural way. We successfully calibrate the model to a time series of euro area CDS spreads
over the period January 2009 until September 2018. The main part of the paper is devoted
to the risk analysis of ESBies and EJBies. We begin by discussing a recent proposal of S&P
for the rating of ESBies, see Kraemer (2017). Using novel results on model-independent price
bounds for ESBies, we show that the S&P proposal is ultra-conservative in the sense that it
attributes to an ESB the worst rating that is logically consistent with the ratings attributed
to the euro area sovereigns. As a next step, we study the robustness of the credit spread (or
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equivalently the risk-neutral expected loss) of ESBies and EJBies with respect to subordina-
tion levels and model parameters. In particular, we consider several parameterizations for the
transition intensities of the common Markov chain, as these largely drive the default depen-
dence in our model. It turns out that, from this perspective, ESBies are very safe already for
low subordination levels (around 15%), in line with the findings of Brunnermeier et al. (2017).
We use several approaches to gauge the market risk of ESBies. First, we compute spread-
trajectories for ESBies via historical simulation, using as input the calibrated trajectories of
the default intensities and of the common Markov chain, and we analyse the relation between
the attachment point of an ESB and the volatility of the ESB-spreads. Second, we carry out
a scenario analysis and study how the risk-neutral default probability of these products is
affected by changes in the underlying risk factors. To robustify our conclusions, we consider
also various contagion scenarios. The results of this analysis are more nuanced. For low
subordination levels and adverse scenarios (such as the case where the default of a major euro
area sovereign leads to a recession in the euro area), the loss probability of ESBies can be fairly
large and spread trajectories can be quite volatile. For high subordination levels exceeding
30–35%, on the other hand, ESBies remain ‘safe’ even in these adverse scenarios. Third, we
compare the risk characteristics of ESBies to those of a safe asset created by pooling the senior
tranche of national bonds. Finally, we use simulations to compute value at risk and expected
shortfall for the return distribution of ESBies. For this we need to estimate the historical
dynamics of the default intensities and the common Markov chain which is done via a suitable
variant of the EM algorithm. From this perspective, the market risk of ESBies is fairly low.
Summarizing, we find that while in normal times ESBies are indeed very safe (in fact safer
than assets created by pooling the senior tranche of national bonds), they may become risky
under extreme circumstances and in contagion scenarios, in particular if the attachment point
is not sufficiently high.
We continue with a discussion of the relevant literature. The report of the European
Systemic Risk Board (2018) extends the quantitative analysis of Brunnermeier et al. (2017)
and considers risk and return characteristics of ESBies and EJBies in various stress scenarios
for default correlation and loss given default; similar issues are studied in Barucci, Brigo,
Francischello and Marazzina (2019) in the context of standard copula models for defaults.
The relevance of market risk for ESBies is discussed verbally in de Grauwe and Ji (2019).
An interesting quantitative analysis of the market associated with ESBies is de Sola Perea,
Dunne and Reininger (2019). They compute hypothetical spread trajectories for tranches
of sovereign bond-backed securities in a copula framework, using observed bond spreads as
input. Techniques from time series analysis (a VAR for VaR analysis and multivariate GARCH
modelling) are used to compute value at risk and marginal expected shortfall for the daily
spread change of these tranches. Further interesting contributions on sovereign bond-backed
securities for the euro area are Langfield (2020) or Cronin and Dunne (2019).
Our work is also related to other strands of the literature on sovereign credit risk, securitiza-
tion and financial innovation. Ang and Longstaff (2013) and Aı¨t-Sahalia, Laeven and Pelizzon
(2014) carry out interesting empirical work on euro area credit spreads. Brigo, Pallavicini
and Torresetti (2010) give an extensive discussion of CDO pricing models and their empirical
properties before and during the financial crisis, see also McNeil, Frey and Embrechts (2015).
We also use insights from Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2012) or Golec and Perotti (2015)
regarding safe assets and financial innovation. Mathematical results on affine processes with
Markov modulated mean reversion level can be found in Elliott and Siu (2009) and in van
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Beek, Mandjes, Spreij and Winands (2020).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we formally introduce
the model and the relevant credit products. Section 3 outlines the calibration of our model to
market data. The main part of the paper is Section 4 where we carry out a thorough analysis of
the risks associated with ESBies: in Section 4.1 we discuss the S&P proposal for the rating of
ESBies and we relate this to model-independent price bounds, Section 4.2 focuses on expected
loss, while Sections 4.3 to 4.6 deal with the market risk of ESBies. In Section 5 we summarize
the findings from the risk analysis and discuss policy implications.
2 The Setup
Default model. Throughout we consider a portfolio of J sovereigns with default times τ j
and default indicators 1{τ j≤t}, 1 ≤ j ≤ J , defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,Q) with
filtration G = (Gt)t≥0. G is the global filtration, that is all processes introduced are G
adapted. In financial terms the σ-field Gt describes the information available to investors
at time t. We assume that (Ω,F ,Q) supports a J-dimensional standard Brownian motion
W = (W 1t , . . . ,W
J
t )t≥0 and a finite-state Markov chain X, independent of W , with state
space SX = {1, 2, . . . ,K} and generator matrix Q = (qkl)1≤k,l≤K . The chain X will be used
to model transitions between K different states or regimes of the euro area economy, and for
k 6= l, qkl gives the intensity of a jump from state k to state l. The measure Q is the risk-neutral
measure used for the valuation of ESBies; price dynamics under the historical measure P are
considered in Section 4.6. In the analysis of the model we also use the filtration F = (Ft)t≥0
that is generated by the Brownian motion W and the Markov chain X.
Our default model under the pricing measureQ is outlined in the following two assumptions.
A1) The default times τ1, . . . , τJ are conditionally independent doubly stochastic default
times with F adapted hazard rate processes γ1, . . . , γJ , see for instance McNeil et al.
(2015, Chapter 17). In mathematical terms, for all t1, . . . , tJ > 0 it holds that
Q
(
τ1 ≥ t1, . . . , τJ > tj | F∞) =
J∏
j=1
exp
(
−
∫ tj
0
γjs ds
)
.
A2) The processes γ1, . . . , γJ follow CIR-type dynamics with Markov modulated and time-
dependent mean-reversion level, that is
dγjt = κ
j(µj(Xt)e
ωjt − γjt )dt+ σj
√
γjt dW
j
t , 1 ≤ j ≤ J, (2.1)
for constants κj , σj > 0, ωj ≥ 0 and functions µj : SX → (0,∞). For notational conve-
nience, we introduce the vector process γ = (γ1t , . . . , γ
J
t )t≥0.
Discussion. For small ∆t the quantity 1{τ j>t}γ
j
t∆t gives the probability that firm j defaults
in the period (t, t + ∆t], that is γj is the default intensity of firm j. Assumption A1 implies
that given the path (γs(ω))
∞
s=0 of the hazard rate process, τ
1, . . . , τJ are independent default
times. Dependence of default events is caused by the special form of the hazard rate dynamics
in A2. More precisely, the assumption that the mean-reversion levels µ1, . . . , µJ of the hazard
rate processes depend on the common finite-state Markov chain X creates co-movement in the
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hazard rate of different sovereigns, so that, unconditionally, default times are dependent. Our
setup permits also country-specific fluctuations in hazard rates; these are generated by the
independent Brownian motions W 1, . . . ,W J driving the hazard rate dynamics. Adding the
factor eω
jt implies that the mean-reversion level of the hazard rates is upward-sloping between
transitions of X. This helps to calibrate the model to the observed term structures of sovereign
CDS spreads which are typically upward-sloping as well; see Section 3 for details.
Following Brunnermeier et al. (2017), we usually consider K = 3 states of the euro area
economy. In the model calibration in Section 3 we find that, for the vast majority of euro area
members, µj(1) < µj(2) < µj(3); that is, the mean reversion level of the hazard rates of euro
area members is lowest in state one and highest in state three. This allows us to interpret these
states as expansion (state one), mild recession (state two) and strong recession (state three).
A statistical analysis in Section 4.6 shows that a model of the form (2.1) with K = 3 states
can also be used to describe the evolution of the calibrated hazard rates under the historical
measure P.
The default model outlined in Assumptions A1) and A2) is well-suited for a risk analysis
of ESBies. In contrast to the copula models used for instance in Barucci et al. (2019) or in
the work of the ESRB (2018), we model the dynamic evolution of hazard rates and credit
spreads. This allows us to generate future spread trajectories, which is important in the
analysis of market risk. By assuming that the hazard rates depend on the common state of
the Euro area economy we generate default dependence in a natural way. This gives a lot
of flexibility for the valuation of ESBies. In fact, the whole range of arbitrage-free prices of
ESBies and EJBies consistent with observed CDS spreads can be obtained within our model if
parameters are chosen appropriately; see Section 4.1 for details. At the same time the model
is fairly tractable: due to the conditional independence assumption it is possible to calibrate
the model simultaneously to CDS spreads of all euro area sovereigns4 and the form of hazard
rate dynamics allows for a fairly efficient computation of credit derivative prices.
On the other hand, our pricing model with conditionally independent defaults does not
allow for contagion effects (upward jumps in the credit spreads of non-defaulted sovereigns
in reaction to a default event in the euro area), which might arise if insufficient measures are
taken to mitigate the economic fallout from the default of a major euro area member, see
Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2018). This is, however, not an issue for studying the risks associated
with ESBies. In fact, with appropriately chosen hazard rate dynamics our pricing model is able
to generate arbitrarily conservative (low) valuations for ESBies. Moreover, contagion matters
most in the analysis of short term price fluctuations and market risk in Section 4.4, and we do
consider contagion scenarios in that context.
Loss process and credit default swaps. The payoff of credit default swaps (CDSs),
ESBies and EJBies depends on the exact form of the losses generated by defaults in the
underlying sovereign-debt portfolio. Next we therefore describe the mathematical model for
the loss processes that we use in our analysis. We fix a horizon T > 0 and a set T of payment
dates 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T which, in practical applications, usually correspond to
4Without conditional independence, the price of single-name credit derivatives depends on the default state
and the hazard rate of other sovereigns in the portfolio, and the calibration of the model to single-name CDS
spreads is practically possible only for very small portfolios. For instance, in the Hawkes process model of
Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2014) spillover effects are only studied for the bivariate case.
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quarterly payments. We define for 1 ≤ j ≤ J the cumulative loss process Lj of sovereign j by
Ljt =
N∑
n=1
1{tn−1<τ j≤tn}1{t≥tn}δ
j
tn , t ∈ [0, T ] , (2.2)
where the random variable δjtn gives the loss given default (LGD) of sovereign j at time tn.
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We assume that, given Ftn , the LGD δjtn is beta distributed with E
(
δjtn | Ftn
)
= δj(Xtn) for a
function δj : SX → (0, 1]. We further assume that, given Xtn , δjtn is independent of all other
model quantities. Working with a random LGD is realistic and, at the same time, helps to
robustify our analysis with respect to the exact values chosen for δj . Given portfolio weights
wj > 0 such that
∑J
j=1w
j = 1, we define the portfolio loss by
Lt =
J∑
j=1
wjLjt , t ≤ T . (2.3)
The cash flow stream of the protection-buyer position in a CDS on sovereign j with spread x
and premium payment dates T can be described in terms of the process Lj ; it is given by
Ljt −
∑
tn≤t
x(tn − tn−1)1{τ j>tn}, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (2.4)
ESBies and EJBies. ESBies have not been issued so far, so there is no description of the
payment structure of an actual product and no term sheet. Therefore, we consider stylized
versions of these products. These stylized ESBies and EJBies do capture the essential features
of every CDO structure, namely pooling and tranching of default risk, so they suffice to analyze
the qualitative properties of ESBies. Denote by VT = 1−LT the normalized value of the asset
pool and note that VT = 1 if there are no defaults in the portfolio. The constant κ ∈ (0, 1)
denotes the lower (upper) attachment point of the senior (junior) tranche. Then the payoff of
a stylized ESB respectively a stylized EJB at T is defined to be
ESBT = min(VT , 1− κ) = VT − (VT − (1− κ))+ = (1− LT )− (κ− LT )+ , (2.5)
EJBT = (VT − (1− κ))+ = (κ− LT )+ . (2.6)
In this way, the EJB bears the first 100κ percent of the loss in the portfolio, if the loss exceeds
κ, the ESB is affected as well. While stylized ESBies and EJBies are path independent, in
the sense that their payoff is a function of the portfolio loss at the maturity date T only, our
analysis is easily extended to path dependent payoffs.
Note that, by definition, we have the following put-call-parity-type relation for the payoff
of a stylized ESB and a stylized EJB with identical attachment point κ
ESBT + EJBT = VT and hence ESBT = (1− LT )− EJBT . (2.7)
Pricing. For simplicity, we assume that the risk-free short rate is constant and equal to
r ≥ 0. We introduce the money market account Bt,s = exp(r(s− t)), s > t, so that B−1t,s is the
discount factor at time t for a payoff due at time s. We use standard risk-neutral valuation
5We prefer to work with (2.2) instead of the more standard definition Ljt = 1{τj≤t}δ
j(Xτj ) as (2.2) is more
convenient for CDS pricing. In any case, for (tn − tn−1) small the two definitions of Lj are close to each other.
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for the pricing of credit derivatives. Hence the price at t of any integrable Gs measurable
contingent claim H is equal to Ht = E
(
B(t, s)−1H | Gt
)
, where the expectation is taken under
the risk-neutral measure Q.
For further use we introduce some notation related to the pricing of ESBies. Let Lt =
(L1t , . . . , L
J
t ). The price of an ESB at time t ∈ {t0, t1, . . . , tN} is given by
E
(
B−1t,T ((1− LT )− (κ− LT )+) | Gt
)
=: hESB,κ (t,Xt,γt,Lt) (2.8)
for a suitable function hESB,κ. This follows from the fact that the processes
(
Xtn ,γtn ,Ltn)
N
n=0
are jointly Markov; we omit the details. Similarly, the price of an EJB is given by
hEJB,κ (t,Xt, γt,Lt) := E
(
B−1t,T (κ− LT )+) | Gt
)
. (2.9)
The key tool for the numerical computation of derivative prices is the extended Laplace trans-
form of the hazard rates. For Markov modulated CIR processes this transform is available in
almost closed form; see Appendix A for details.
3 Calibration
Data and calibration design. The available data consist of weekly CDS spread quotes from
ICE data services for ten euro area sovereigns and times-to-maturity equal to 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
years over the period January 7, 2009 until September 3, 2018, giving rise to 510 observation
dates. The sovereigns used in our analysis are Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Germany
(DEU), Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), the Republic of Ireland (IRL), Italy
(ITA), the Netherlands (NLD) and Portugal (PRT), making up more than 90% of the euro area
GDP in 2018. Table 4 reports summary statistics (sample mean, sample standard deviation,
minimum and maximum) of the CDS spreads, together with the most recent Standard & Poor’s
credit-rating of the ten sovereigns. Average spreads vary considerably across countries and,
with the exception of Ireland, the term structures of the average spreads is upward sloping.
We calibrate the model by minimizing the sum of squared differences between the CDS
spreads observed on the market and the spreads generated by the model. In order to reduce the
dimension of the parameter space, we fix the mean function and the concentration parameter
of the beta distribution of the loss given default δjtn at the outset.
6 The distinct values for the
mean function δj(·) can be found in Table 5 in the appendix. Following Brunnermeier et al.
(2017) we assume that the mean LGD is highest in state 3 (the recession state) and lowest
in state 1. Moreover, we work with a concentration parameter ν = 1.5; this is a conservative
choice as it leads to a fairly widespread LGD distribution (and we will see in Section 4 that
a widespread LGD distribution makes ESBies riskier). While the order of magnitude of the
mean LGD is in line with the sovereign-debt literature, the exact numerical values for the mean
LGD and the concentration parameter ν were handpicked by the authors.7 In Section 4.5 we
6The parametrization in terms of mean and concentration parameter is a useful alternative to the standard
representation of the beta distribution. Denote by g(x; a, b) = β(a, b)xa−1(1− x)b−11{x∈[0,1]} the beta density
for given parameters a, b > 0. Then the mean is given by a/(a+b) and the concentration parameter is ν := a+b.
A high value of ν implies that the LGD is very concentrated around its conditional mean.
7In fact, ν cannot be calibrated from CDS spreads, since model CDS spreads depend only on the conditional
mean of the LGD.
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therefore study the robustness of our risk analysis with respect to the parameters of the LGD
distribution.
In the calibration we work with K = 3 states of X and we use the EONIA at date t as a
proxy for rt. We have to determine the trajectories of X and γ and the parameters (Θ
j , σj , Q)
with Θj = (µj(1), µj(2), µj(3), κj , ωj). We impose the restriction that all parameters are
nonnegative, and, to preserve the interpretation of µj(·) as mean-reversion level, we impose
the uniform lower bound κj > 0.1 for all j. We use s0 < s1 < · · · < sM to denote the
observation dates and we write {γsm} = {γs0 , . . . ,γsM } and {Xsm} = {Xs0 , . . . , XsM } for
trajectories of γ and X. Denote by cdsjsm,u the market CDS spread with time to maturity u
at time sm and by ĉds(u, γ
j
sm ,Θ
j , σj , Q,Xsm) the corresponding model spread as function of
γjsm , Xsm and of the model parameters. We determine the model parameters and the realized
trajectories {γsm} and {Xsm} by minimizing the global calibration error
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
(
cdsjsm,u− ĉds(u, γjsm ,Θj , σj , Q,Xsm)
)2
,
using a set of modern optimization algorithms. For this we use an iterative approach which is
described in detail in Appendix C.
Results. We implement the calibration methodology on the full time series of available CDS
data. We use maturities of one and five years since one-year CDS spreads are particularly
informative regarding the current value of the hazard rates whereas five-year CDS markets
are most liquid. To assess the quality of the calibration, we report in Table 1 the root mean
squared error (RMSE) for all countries and both maturities. As RMSE is scale-dependent, we
also report a relative measure for the calibration error, namely the mean absolute percentage
error (MAPE). The quality of the calibration is illustrated further in Figure 9 in Appendix C,
where we plot the time series of CDS spreads together with the model prices and the absolute
pricing errors for the Germany and Italy. Given the complexity of the calibration task, we
conclude that the calibrated model fits the observed CDS spreads reasonably well.
Mat. AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA IRL ITA NLD PRT
RMSE (bp)
1 6.36 8.70 4.73 39.72 3.58 6.75 4.58 0.45 2.90 1.49
5 15.58 15.30 9.26 45.41 6.73 13.07 40.10 34.76 10.60 66.56
MAPE (%)
1 27.25 27.48 20.55 34.47 29.60 23.94 5.27 0.45 6.17 1.86
5 26.29 24.36 20.85 20.11 15.79 21.62 28.54 15.38 20.74 27.59
Table 1: Calibration error in basis points for maturities of one and five years.
Tables 2 and 3 report the parameter values resulting from the calibration. First, note that
µj(1) < µj(2) < µj(3) for all sovereigns except Germany, where µ(1) ≥ µ(2).8 The uniform
ordering of the mean-reversion levels allows us to interpret the states of X as expansion, mild
and strong recession, and it provides clear evidence that there is strong co-movement in the
market’s perception of the credit quality of euro area members. The resulting ordering of the
8This reverse ordering is easily explained by Germany’s prominent role as the euro area’s safe haven in times
of financial distress.
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mean reversion levels is also in line with the empirical findings of Altman, Brady, Resti and
Sironi (2005), who show that the LGD of corporate bonds is typically positively correlated
with their respective default rates (recall that the mean function of the LGD satisfies δj(1) ≤
δj(2) ≤ δj(3) for all sovereigns). The mean reversion speed κj is quite low for all countries,
and for four of them (Austria, Belgium, Finland and France) it is equal to the exogenously
imposed lower bound of 0.1. Consequently, market participants expect idiosyncratic credit
shocks to have a long-lasting effect across the term structure of CDS spreads. The motivation
for including the parameter ωj is to better capture the upward sloping term structure of most
of the CDS series. In fact, for ωj = 0 and unrestricted κj , the calibration frequently leads
to negative values for κj — a common phenomenon also reported e.g. in Ang and Longstaff
(2013). Table 3 reports the estimate of the generator matrix Q. Note that, for the estimated
Q, transitions to non-neighbouring states have zero probability.
Figure 1 plots the calibrated hazard rates together with the calibrated trajectory of the
Markov chain X. The process X remains in state one for most of the sample period, the only
exceptions occur at the height of the European sovereign debt crisis from mid-2010 until late
2013, when the chain visits states two and three before settling in state one again. In general,
the paths of the hazard rates are in line with the movement of the Markov chain; exceptional
individual events such as the rise of the Portuguese hazard rates at the beginning of 2016 or
the sudden upward movement of Italian rates during mid-2018 are of idiosyncratic nature.
Param. AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA IRL ITA NLD PRT
µ(1) 0.0049 0.0044 0.0027 0.0053 0.0047 0.0051 0.0177 0.0710 0.0045 0.0656
µ(2) 0.0049 0.0128 0.0001 0.0189 0.0048 0.0085 0.0746 0.0727 0.0049 0.2030
µ(3) 0.0424 0.0486 0.0338 0.0558 0.0209 0.0502 0.2498 0.4099 0.0458 0.2115
κ 0.1000 0.1000 0.1076 2.6879 0.1000 0.1000 0.1920 0.1215 0.1197 0.1181
ω 0.1730 0.1924 0.1534 0.0826 0.1592 0.1916 0.0004 0.0011 0.0994 0.0219
σ 0.1447 0.1152 0.0872 0.2472 0.0639 0.1075 0.1994 0.2113 0.0925 0.3162
Table 2: Calibration results: parameters of hazard rate dynamics .
State 1 State 2 State 3
State 1 (expansion) −0.1421 0.1421 0.0000
State 2 (mild recession) 0.5843 −1.1685 0.5843
State 3 (strong recession) 0.0000 0.9630 −0.9630
Table 3: Calibration results: generator matrix Q of X.
4 Risk analysis
After the successful calibration of our model, we may now analyze the risks associated with
ESBies. We begin with a short overview. In Section 4.1 we discuss a recent proposal of
the rating agency Standard and Poors (S&P) for the rating of ESBies (Kraemer (2017)) and
we relate the S&P proposal to a worst-case default scenario where the arbitrage-free price of
ESBies attains its lower bound. In Section 4.2 we compute the risk-neutral expected loss (or
equivalently the credit spread) of ESBies as a function of the attachment point κ for different
parameter sets. We consider a base parameter set corresponding largely to the parameters
obtained in the model calibration of Section 3, two crisis sets with higher default correlation
and an extremal distribution that corresponds to the worst-case default scenario.
9
2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
Estimated Hazard Rates
as.Date(dates)
γ t
AUT
BEL
DEU
ESP
FIN
FRA
IRL
ITA
NLD
PRT
2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Estimated Markov chain
X t
1
2
3
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we graph
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γt as this is the natural scale for a CIR process.
The subprime credit crisis has shown that the expected loss at maturity gives only limited
information regarding the riskiness of tranched credit products such as ESBies. In fact, the
market value of AAA-rated senior tranches of mortgage backed securities (MBS) fell sharply
during the crisis (some were even downgraded), creating huge losses for many MBS investors.
To analyze if ESBies can perform all functions of a safe asset, we thus need to take a closer look
at the associated market risk. We do this in several ways. First, we use a historical simulation
approach and compute credit spread trajectories of ESBies for different attachment points,
using as input the calibrated trajectories {Xsm} and {γsm} from Section 3. This analysis gives
useful information on the relation between κ and the volatility of ESB credit spreads. Second,
many potential ESB investors, such as managers of money market funds, are extremely risk
averse so that “behavior in (quasi) safe asset markets may be subject to sudden runs when
new information suggests even a minimal chance of a loss” (Golec and Perotti 2015). In
Section 4.4 we therefore study how the risk-neutral loss probability Q(LT > κ) of ESBies is
affected by changes in the underlying risk factors. To guard against model misspecification and
to incorporate stylized facts regarding investor behavior on markets for safe assets, we include
various contagion scenarios into this analysis. Third, we compare the risk profile of ESBies to
that of a safe asset created by pooling the senior tranche of national bonds and we study the
robustness of both product classes with respect to the LGD distribution, see Section 4.5. In
Section 4.6 we finally use simulations to study Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall for the
mark-to-market loss of ESBies. For this we resort to the model dynamics under the real-world
measure.
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4.1 The weak-link approach of S&P and worst-case default scenarios
In a recent technical document, Kraemer (2017) discusses how the rating agency Standard and
Poors (S&P) would determine a rating for ESBies and EJBies. The proposed methodology is
termed weak-link approach. The S&P proposal has led to a lot of discussion since it associates
a BBB- rating to an ESB with attachment point κ = 30% (given sovereign-bond ratings of
2017), which is at odds with the idea that ESBies are safe assets meriting top ratings.
To facilitate the description of the approach, we assume that the sovereigns are ordered
according to their rating, so that sovereign one has the best rating and sovereign J has the
worst rating. Given an ESB with attachment point κ, define the index j∗ by j∗ = max{1 ≤
j ≤ J : ∑Ji=j wi ≥ κ}. Then, under the weak-link approach, the ESB is assigned the rating of
sovereign j∗. The assumption underlying this approach is that “sovereigns will default in the
order of their ratings, with lowest rated sovereigns defaulting first” (Kraemer 2017, Page 4)
and that the LGD of all sovereigns is equal to one, so that the ESB incurs a loss as soon as
the sovereign j∗ defaults.
In this section we show that the weak-link approach is extremely conservative in various
respects. We begin by a concise mathematical description. We drop the time index and
consider sovereign debt portfolios with generic loss variables Lj = δj1{τ j≤T}, 1 ≤ j ≤ J , with
values in the interval [0, 1]. We assume that the expected loss of each sovereign is fixed, that is
E
(
Lj
)
= ¯`j for a constant ¯`j ∈ [0, 1]. This is a stylized way of calibrating the model to given
ratings or credit spreads of the sovereigns. We order the sovereigns by their credit quality and
assume that ¯`1 ≤ ¯`2 · · · ≤ ¯`J . Next, we define loss variables that represent the default scenario
of the weak link approach. Fix some standard uniform random variable U and define the loss
vector L∗ = (L∗1, . . . , L∗J) by
L∗j = 1{U>1−¯`j} , 1 ≤ j ≤ J (4.1)
Clearly, E
(
L∗j
)
= Q(L∗j = 1)Q(U > 1 − ¯`j) = ¯`j , so that L∗ respects the expected-loss
constraint. Moreover, under (4.1) sovereigns default exactly in the order of their credit quality
with sovereign J defaulting first and δj = 1 for all j, that is L∗ is indeed a mathematical model
for the weak link approach. Note that the loss vector L∗ is comonotonic since its components
are given by increasing functions of the same one-dimensional random variable U , see McNeil
et al. (2015, Chapter 7). Hence, under the weak-link approach, diversification effects between
euro area members are ignored completely.
The next result shows that the loss variables in (4.1) can be interpreted as worst-case
default scenario in the sense that they minimize the value of ESBies over all loss variables that
respect the expected loss constraints. Hence, the price of an ESB under the worst-case scenario
is a lower bound for the arbitrage-free price of that bond in any model consistent with these
constraints. In the rating context this means that the weak link approach associates with an
ESB the worst rating logically consistent with the ratings of the individual euro area sovereigns.
Proposition 4.1. Define for generic loss variables L = (L1, . . . , LJ) such that Lj takes values
in the interval [0, 1] and E
(
Lj
)
= ¯`j and fixed weights w1, . . . , wJ summing to one the portfolio
loss by L =
∑J
j=1w
jLj. Then it holds for κ ∈ [0, 1] that
E
(
1− L∗ − (κ− L∗)+) ≤ E(1− L− (κ− L)+). (4.2)
The proof can be found in Appendix B.
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We now discuss several economic implications. First, under the worst-case default scenario
the LGD of all sovereigns is almost surely equal to one. Note that under constraints on the
expected loss a high LGD implies a low value for the default probability of a given sovereign,
so that L∗ corresponds to a default scenario with ‘few but large losses’. Second, the worst-case
default scenario maximizes the probability of large default “clusters” given the expected loss
constraints. This is explained in detail in Appendix B where we discuss properties of the
distribution pi∗ of L∗. Third, note that it is possible to approximate the worst-case default
scenario by properly parameterized versions of the model introduced in Section 2; a precise
construction is given in Appendix B. This shows that it is possible to generate arbitrarily
conservative valuations for ESBies in our setup.
The qualitative properties of L∗ suggest that, in the dynamic default model from Section 2,
an ESB is more risky for a given expected-loss level of the sovereigns if one chooses high
values for the mean reversion level of the default intensities in the recession state K, so that
many defaults are quite likely in that state; at the same time the generator matrix has to be
parameterized in such a way that state K is visited relatively infrequently in order to meet the
expected loss constraints. This intuition underlies the construction of the crisis scenarios in
the numerical experiments reported in the next sections. More generally, Proposition 4.1 gives
a theoretical justification for the qualitative properties of ESBie prices observed in Section 4.2
and in the work of Barucci et al. (2019), Brunnermeier et al. (2017) or ESRB (2018): for a
given expected-loss level of the sovereigns higher default correlations and a higher LGD leads
to a higher expected loss for ESBies.
4.2 Expected Loss of ESBies
From now on we consider ESBies with a time to maturity of five years and, for simplicity, a
risk free interest rate r = 0. In order to make the prices of ESBies with different attachment
points κ comparable, we consider normalized ESBies with payoff 11−κ min(VT , 1 − κ), so that
the payoff of a normalized ESB is equal to one if there is no default, i.e. for LT ≤ κ. Moreover,
we introduce the risk-neutral expected tranche loss
`ESB,κ(0, X0,γ0,L0 ; Q,µ) = 1− 1
1− κh
ESB,κ(0, X0,γ0,L0 ; Q,µ) . (4.3)
Here µ = {µj(k)), 1 ≤ k ≤ 3, 1 ≤ j ≤ J}, Q is the generator matrix of X and the function
hESB,κ (t,Xt,γt,Lt ; Q,µ) gives the price of an ESB with attachment point κ at time t, see
equation (2.8). We have made the parameters Q and µ explicit in (4.3) since we want to study
how variations in their values affect the expected loss of ESBies. Note that we may interpret
the annualized expected loss 1T `
ESB,κ as credit spread cESB,κ(0, T ) of a normalized ESB with
attachment point κ. In fact, since r = 0 and since for x close to one lnx ≈ x− 1, it holds that
cESB,κ(0, T ) =
−1
T
ln
( 1
1− κh
ESB,κ
)
≈ 1
T
`ESB,κ .
Parameters. As before, we work with K = 3 states of X. We choose the portfolio weights
wj according to the GDP proportions within the euro area; numerical values are given in
Table 6 in Appendix C. We use the mean LGD from Table 5, the volatility parameters σj
and the calibrated trajectories {γsm} and {Xsm} obtained in Section 3. In our numerical
experiments we consider three different parameter sets and the worst-case distribution pi∗ (the
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distribution of the worst case default scenario from Proposition 4.1). In the base parameter
set we use the generator matrix from Section 3. We take ωj = 09 and calibrate µ and κj to
the full CDS term structure at the valuation date, so that the parameterized model accurately
reflects the market’s expectation at that date.10
The generator matrix Q is hard to calibrate from historical data, essentially since products
depending on the default correlation of euro area countries are not traded. To deal with
the ensuing model risk, we introduce two crisis parameter sets. In these parameterizations the
recession state (state three) occurs less frequently than under the base parametrization, but if it
occurs default intensities are (on average) substantially larger than for the base parameter set.
To achieve this, we consider two generator matrices Q˜1 and Q˜2 chosen such that, on average,
X spends less time in state three than under the base parametrization. The corresponding
mean reversion levels µ˜1 and µ˜2 and are determined from the constraint that the expected
loss E(LjT ) is identical for all parameter sets; this typically leads to µ
j(3) < µ˜j1(3) < µ˜
j
2(3).
The entries of Q˜1, Q˜2 are provided in Table C.4.
Results. In the top panel of Figure 2, we graph the average expected loss11 of ESBies over
the period from 2014 to September 2018 as a function of the threshold κ. We do this for the
base parametrization, the two crisis parameterizations and the worst-case distribution from
Proposition 4.1. The scale for the y-axis is logarithmic and values are given in percentage
points. In addition, we consider AAA- and A- rated sovereigns (DEU, NLD and IRL, ESP,
respectively) and compute the 1%- and 99%-quantile of the risk-neutral expected loss over the
period from 2014 to September 2018. Those quantiles form the boundaries of the colored areas
in Figure 2; they are supposed to give an indication of the credit quality for the ESBies on a
rating scale.12
From Figure 2 we draw the following conclusions. First, the average risk-neutral expected
loss of ESBies is indeed small. For example, the average expected loss corresponding to the
proposed attachment point of 0.3 is below 0.1%. Most strikingly, except for the worst-case
distribution, the average expected loss of ESBies with thresholds of 0.15 or higher is well below
the lower bound of the AAA-region. Second, the expected loss is lowest for the base parameters,
followed by crisis parameterizations 1 and 2; this is fully in line with the economic intuition
underlying the construction of these parameter sets. Third, the expected loss for the worst-case
distribution (which is highest by construction) is substantially higher than the expected loss
in the crisis parameterizations, underlining the fact that the worst-case distribution, and the
associated weak-link approach of Kraemer (2017), are extremely conservative. Nonetheless, for
κ > 0.25 the average expected loss for the worst-case distribution is still comparable in size to
that of AAA-rated sovereigns. Fourth, the expected loss of an ESB is decreasing approximately
at an exponential rate in κ in all four parameter sets (recall that we use a logarithmic scale
for the y-axis). Summarizing, these findings show that an investor willing to hold ESBies with
9Using a different value for ωj has only a very minor impact on the spread and the loss probability of ESBies.
10The calibration in Section 3, on the other hand, yields a fixed set of parameters giving a reasonable fit
throughout the entire observation period. This provides evidence for the good performance of our model in
explaining market data, but is of course subject to small pricing errors at any given date.
11Here the term “average” refers to the average over observation dates, but with a fixed time to maturity of
five years, that is we plot the function κ 7→ 1
M
∑M
m=1 `
ESB,κ(0, Xsm ,γsm ,0 ; Q,µ).
12We stress that these indicative ratings should not be taken as actual ratings of ESBies, since they are
computed from risk-neutral expected losses and not from historical ones, and since a rating is more than a
mechanical mapping of expected loss to some rating scale.
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an attachment point of 0.15 or higher until maturity faces little risk of default-induced losses,
which is in agreement with the analysis of Brunnermeier et al. (2017) or Barucci et al. (2019).
The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows the average expected loss of EJBies for varying attach-
ment points. With five-year expected loss levels ranging from 6% to around 15% (and hence
annualized credit spreads between 1.2% and 3%) the risk of EJBies is comparable to that of
lower-quality euro area sovereigns. Comparing the expected loss of ESBies and EJBies, we
see that, in line with the proposal of Brunnermeier et al. (2017), EJBies bear the bulk of the
credit risk associated to the eurozone sovereigns. Note that the reverse ordering of the lines in
the two panels of Figure 2 is an immediate consequence of the put-call parity relation (2.7).
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Figure 2: Average expected loss of ESBies (top) and of EJBs (bottom) for different thresholds and
parameterizations (in %). Note that both graphs use a logarithmic scale on the y-axis.
4.3 Spread Trajectories of ESBies
In Figure 3 we plot trajectories of the annualized credit spread cESB,κ of ESBies over the whole
sample period for different levels of κ. These spreads were computed from our model by a
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historical simulation approach using the calibrated trajectories {γsm} and {Xsm} as input.
The solid line gives the spread of an ESB with attachment point κ = 0.3 (the value proposed
by Brunnermeier et al. (2017)); the colored lines correspond to different attachment points
κ ∈ [0.2, 0.4]. The simulated ESB spreads peak in 2009 (the height of the financial crisis) and
in the period 2011–2013 (the height of the European sovereign debt crisis). We see that the
attachment point has a large impact on the volatility of ESB spreads. In particular for κ close
to 0.2 spreads are very volatile; for κ > 0.3 on the other hand spread fluctuations are quite
small.
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Figure 3: Spr ad trajectories of ESBies with varying threshold levels. The solid black line represents
the reference threshold of 0.3.
4.4 Market risk analysis via scenarios
In this section, we analyze how the risk-neutral loss probability Q(LT > κ) of ESBies is affected
by changes in the underlying risk factors X0,γ0 and L0. In mathematical terms, we consider
the function
κ 7→ pκ(X0,γ0,L0 ; Q,µ) := Q(LT > κ | X0,γ0,L0 ; Q,µ).
We consider different sets of risk factor changes or scenarios. First we study scenarios which
are included in the support of the default model from Section 2, such as a change in the state
of X. Moreover, we consider several contagion scenarios where, in reaction to a default of
Italy,13 the market becomes more risk averse and changes its perception of the state of X and
the parameter set used to value ESBies. In fact, investors on markets for (quasi) safe assets
frequently change their expectations in reaction to adverse events, putting more mass on bad
outcomes; see for instance Gennaioli et al. (2012).
13We consider a default of Italy since on the day we used for this analysis (September 3, 2018, the last
observation date in our sample) Italy had the highest CDS spread of all major euro area economies. A default
of another major ‘risky’ euro area sovereign would yield similar results.
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Non-contagion scenarios. In the left panel of Figure 4, we graph the function pκ on
a log-scale using the parameters of the base scenarios and the calibrated values of γ and
X for September 3, 2018 (the last observation date in our sample). The full circles give
the loss probability for varying κ for the base scenario, where the chain is in state one (the
good economic state) and no euro area member is in default (in mathematical terms this is
the function κ 7→ pκ(1,γ0,L0 ; Q,µ)). Moreover, we consider four types of changes in the
underlying risk factors:
(i) the scenario where all hazard rates experience an upward jump of 10%, that is we plot
the function κ 7→ pκ(1,γ0 × 1.1,L0 ; Q,µ);
(ii) the scenario where the economy moves to a light recession, corresponding to the function
κ 7→ pκ(2,γ0,L0 ; Q,µ);
(iii) the scenario where the economy moves to a severe recession (κ 7→ pκ(3,γ0,L0 ; Q,µ));
(iv) the scenario where Italy defaults with random LGD δITA. We assume that δITA is
beta distributed with mean 0.5, i.e. the loss vector at t = 0 takes the form L0 =
(0, . . . , 0, δITA, 0, . . . , 0), but all other risk factors stay unchanged.
The horizontal dashed lines correspond to the risk-neutral five year default probabilities of
Germany, Belgium and Ireland under the base parametrization.
Inspection of the left panel of Figure 4 shows first that a change in the hazard rates has only
a small impact on the loss probability of ESBies. The default of a major euro area sovereign
such as Italy has a stronger effect, but for κ > 0.25, the loss probability remains small even
after a major default. The most important risk factor changes are clearly changes in the state
of the economy. For instance, for κ = 0.3 the loss probability of an ESB in state three is
slightly larger than the risk-neutral default probability of Belgium, whereas in state one the
loss probability is considerably smaller than the risk-neutral default probability of Germany.
Second, we observe that for the given range of κ the threshold probabilities are decreasing
in κ roughly at an exponential rate, similarly as the expected loss does.14 In fact, the loss
probability is quite sensitive with respect to the choice of the attachment point (to see this,
one may compare the values of pκ for κ = 0.35 and κ = 0.3 in scenario (iii)).
Contagion scenarios. In the right panel of Figure 4 we graph the function pκ (again on a
log-scale) for the base parametrization and for three different contagion scenarios, namely
(i) the case where Italy defaults and where, as a reaction, X jumps to state two (mild
recession);
(ii) the case where Italy defaults and where, as a reaction, X jumps to state three (strong
recession);
(iii) the case where Italy defaults and where, as a reaction, X jumps to state three and the
market uses the crisis parametrization two (instead of the base parameter set). This
scenario is motivated by the observation that, in the subprime crisis, investors used
much more conservative assumptions for default dependence than before the crisis, see
for instance Brigo et al. (2010) for details.
14We found this exponential decay for a wide range of parameter values, but we do not have a fully convincing
theoretical justification for this effect.
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We see that, for an attachment point κ ≤ 0.3, the change in the loss probability caused by
one of the contagion scenarios is quite substantial. For instance, in the extreme scenario (iii),
the risk-neutral loss probability is of the order of 5%. For attachment points κ > 0.35 the
impact is less drastic. However, under scenario (iii), even for κ = 0.35 we get a risk-neutral
threshold probability of around 2%, which is definitely non-negligible for a safe asset. This is
in stark contrast to the analysis of the expected loss in Section 4.2, where ESBies appeared
‘safe’ already for κ > 0.15.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.25 0.30 0.35
0.
00
1
0.
00
2
0.
00
5
0.
01
0
0.
02
0
0.
05
0
0.
10
0
0.
20
0
threshold
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
D
EU
BE
L
IR
L
l
l
switch to state 3
switch to state 2
default of Italy
rise of hazard rates
base
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.25 0.30 0.35
0.
00
1
0.
00
2
0.
00
5
0.
01
0
0.
02
0
0.
05
0
0.
10
0
0.
20
0
threshold
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
D
EU
BE
L
IR
L
l
l
default of Italy + switch to state 3 (cris. gen. mat. 2)
default of Italy + switch to state 3
default of Italy + switch to state 2
base
Probability of Default Events (2018−09−03)
Figure 4: Loss probability of ESBies for different κ and various scenarios. Note that the plot uses a
logarithmic scale on the y-axis.
4.5 Pooling senior national tranches and robustness with respect to the
LGD distribution
Leandro and Zettelmeyer (2019) and a few other recent contributions suggest an alternative
approach for constructing a safe asset for the euro area. In these proposals, the euro area
sovereigns issue national bonds in (at least) two tranches, a senior and a junior tranche. A
safe asset is then formed by pooling the senior tranche of the national debt, so that we use
the acronym PSNT (pooled senior national tranche) for these products.15 In this section we
compare the risk-neutral expected loss and the risk-neutral loss probability of PSNTs to those
of ESBies. In particular, we focus on the impact of the random LGD since we cannot fully
calibrate the distribution of the LGD from available market data. We begin with a formal
description of the payoff of PSNTs. Given some attachment level κ that marks the split
between the junior and the senior national bond tranches, we model the payoff of the senior
tranche issued by sovereign j as Lj,κT := (1 − κ) − (LjT − κ)+. Note that the senior national
tranche suffers a loss if LjT exceeds the threshold κ. For fixed weights w
1, . . . , wJ , the payoff
15From a financial engineering viewpoint also the E-Bonds of Monti (2010) fall in the category of national
tranching followed by pooling; ESBies on the other hand correspond to pooling followed by tranching.
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of the PSNT is then given by
J∑
j=1
wjLj,κT = (1− κ)−
J∑
j=1
wj(LjT − κ)+ .
Hence the PSNT consists of a safe payment of size 1 − κ and a short position in a weighted
portfolio of options on the national losses. The normalized risk-neutral expected loss or equiv-
alently the non-annualized credit spread of a PSNT is given by
1
1− κ
J∑
j=1
wjE
(
(LjT − κ)+
)
.
It follows that the credit spread of PSNTs is independent of the dependence structure of the
national losses L1T , . . . , L
J
T . Assumptions on the distribution of the loss given default, on the
other hand, have a huge impact on the spread of PSNTs. We begin with a few qualitative
observations: first, it is easily seen that for fixed expected loss E(LjT ), the option price E
(
(LjT−
κ)+
)
is maximal if LjT ∈ {0, 1}. Hence, for fixed expected loss level of the sovereigns, the
expected loss of a PSNT is maximal if the LGD of all sovereigns is equal to one. In fact,
in that case the tranching on the national level offers no additional protection for the PSNT
compared to simply pooling the national bonds. Second, if the LGD of all sovereigns is almost
surely smaller than κ, the PSNT is entirely riskless. Finally, due to the convexity of the
function ` 7→ (`− κ)+ the expected loss of the PNST increases with increasing variance of the
LGD distribution (keeping E(LjT ) fixed).
Next, we provide quantitative results comparing the behavior of PSNT credit spreads to
that of ESBies. Throughout this section, whenever we vary the mean of the random LGD,
we also recalibrate the remaining model parameters such that any considered LGD setup is
still in line with market data. Figure 5 shows the average spread for ESBies (grey) and for
PSNTs (black) over the period 2014-2018 for three different LGD distributions with identical
mean function given in Table 5 and different variance/concentration parameter. We make
the following observations. First, the spread of PNSTs is very sensitive to assumptions on
the variance of the LGD distribution whereas the spread of ESBies is comparatively stable.
Second, for the given mean function the spread of PNSTs is substantially higher than for
ESBies. In fact, even with deterministic LGD the expected loss of an ESBie with κ = 0.3
equals the expected loss of a PNST with κ ≈ 0.6; with higher LGD variance the two expected
losses are equal only if the attachment point of the PSNT is close to one. The difference
between the spreads of ESBies and of PSNTs is due to the fact that the default of a single
euro area sovereign is sufficient to cause a loss for a PSNT, whereas ESBies are only affected
in a severe default scenario with multiple defaults. Moreover, for the payoff of a PSNT it
makes a substantial difference if a sovereign defaults only on its junior bond tranche or on
both tranches which explains the sensitivity with respect to the LGD variance.
Finally, we consider the risk-neutral loss probability. Note first that the risk-neutral loss
probability of PSNTs is affected by the dependence structure of L1T , . . . , L
J
T (other than the
spread). In fact, for fixed marginal distributions of the sovereign losses, the risk-neutral loss
probability of PSNTs decreases with increasing default correlation. This is akin to the be-
haviour of the equity tranche in standard CDO structures. In Figure 6 we graph the risk-neutral
loss probability of ESBies and PSNTs for various values of the mean and the concentration
parameter of the LGD distribution. We observe the following: first, for the parameter values
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Figure 5: Spread of ESBies (grey) and of PSNTs (black) for varying κ and different value for the
concentration parameter of the LGD distribution. The graph labelled base case corresponds to ν = 1.5
(the same value as in Figure 2); the low variance case corresponds to the higher value ν = 3.3 of the
concentration parameter. We fix T = 5. Note that the plot uses a logarithmic scale on the y-axis.
considered the loss probability of PSNTs is substantially higher than that of ESBies. Second,
changes in the mean and in the concentration parameter have a profound impact on the loss
probability of PSNTs; for ESBies these effects are less pronounced. For a κ = 0.3, the loss
probability of an ESB increases from 0.0043 in the base setup to 0.0072 for the higher mean
case (which is still below the loss probability of a German bond, cf. Section 4.4). In compari-
son, for a relatively high κ = 0.9, the risk-neutral loss probability of an PSNT increases from
0.089 to 0.142.
4.6 Market Risk Analysis via Loss Distributions
So far we were concerned with the value of ESBies and EJBies in different scenarios; values
were computed using the risk-neutral measure Q, so that model parameters were derived via
calibration. On the other hand, for computing measures of market risk for the return of
ESBies, we have to simulate their loss distribution under the historical measure P, so that we
need to estimate the P dynamics of X and γ using statistical methods. This issue is addressed
next.
EM estimation of hazard rate dynamics. In this section, we report the results of an
empirical study where a model of the form (2.1) is estimated from the calibrated hazard rates
of the euro area countries (the trajectories {γsm} generated in the calibration procedure of
Section 3). Here we assume that the trajectory of the Markov chain is not directly observable;
rather, the available information is carried by the filtration Fγ = (Fγt )t≥0 generated by the
hazard rates process γ. This assumption is motivated by the fact that the calibration of the
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Figure 6: Loss probability of PSNTs (black) and ESBies (grey) for varying κ and different value for
the mean of the LGD distribution (left) and for the concentration parameter ν of the LGD distribution
(right). The graph labelled base case corresponds to ν = 1.5 and expected loss as in Table 5. For the
higher mean setup, we increase the mean LGD of state 2 (state 3) by 0.2 (by 0.3) for all countries. The
lower variance case uses the base mean and ν = 3.3. We fix T = 5. The plot uses a logarithmic scale
on the y-axis and different scales on the x axis (grey for ESBies and black for PSNTs).
trajectory {Xsm} in Section 3 is quite sensitive with respect to the chosen model parameters,
whereas the calibration of {γsm} is very robust (essentially due to the close connection between
hazard rates and one-year CDS spreads).
Using stochastic filtering and a version of the EM algorithm adapted to our setting, we
obtain the filtered and smoothed estimate for the trajectory of X, an estimate of the generator
matrix of X and of country-specific parameters such as mean reversion levels and speed, all
under the real-world measure P. In the EM algorithm we use robust filtering techniques, which
perform well in a situation where observations are only approximately of the form (2.1). For
further details on the methodology see Elliott (1993) or Damian, Eksi-Altay and Frey (2018).
We consider K = 3 possible states of X, corresponding to a expansionary regime, a light
recession and a strong recession, respectively. The EM estimates for the generator matrix Q of
X are given in Tables 8 and 9 in Appendix C, together with country-specific parameters such
as mean reversion speed and levels. Note that we do not estimate the volatility, but we work
with quadratic variation instead.16 Overall the estimates appear reasonable. In particular, the
estimated mean reversions levels for most countries respect the ordering µj(1) < µj(2) < µj(3),
supporting the interpretation of the states of X.17 As expected, for any given state of the
economy the estimated levels are lowest for the stronger euro area countries. In Figure 7, we
give a trajectory of the filtered and the smoothed state of X, that is we plot the trajectories
t 7→ EP(Xt | Fγt ) and t 7→ EP(Xt | FγT ). These results show that the proposed model describes
16In order to robustify the EM estimation procedure, we scale the quadratic variation of the strong euro area
countries slightly upward.
17For Spain and Portugal, the highest mean reversion level is estimated for state 2, which is probably due to
the idiosyncratic behavior these two countries, particularly Portugal, exhibit in the first months of 2012.
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Figure 7: Filtered (EP (Xt|Fγt )) and smoothed (EP (Xt|FγT )) estimates of the Markov chain trajectory.
the qualitative properties of euro area credit spreads and, in particular, the co-movement of
spread levels of the weaker euro-area members reasonably well. The frequent transitions in
and out of the middle state are not surprising, given that this state reflects a situation where
only a few countries experience a rise in default intensities.
Measures of market risk. We use two popular risk measures, Value at Risk (VaRα) and
Expected Shortfall (ESα) at confidence level α, to study the tail of the loss distribution of
ESBies over a horizon of three months. Denote by γ0 and X0 the calibrated hazard rates and
the state of X for September 3, 2018. We generate N = 100 000 realizations of the hazard
rates and the Markov chain with initial values γ0 and X0 over a three-month horizon, using
the P-parameters estimated in the previous paragraph, and we index the simulation outcome
by i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. We then compute the corresponding relative loss
Rκ,i := 1− h
ESB,κ(0.25, X
(i)
0.25,γ
(i)
0.25,L0)
hESB,κ(0, X0,γ0,L0)
.
VaR and expected shortfall are then computed from the empirical distribution of the sampled
relative losses {Rκ,i, i = 1, . . . , N}, see McNeil et al. (2015, Section 9.2.6) for details.
Figure 8 summarizes our analysis. We plot estimates of VaRα (left) and of ESα (right)
for the three-month distribution of negative ESB-returns for different κ and confidence levels
α = 0.95 (points) and α = 0.99 (crosses). We see that both risk measure estimates decrease
approximately at an exponential rate in κ. The horizontal lines in each plot represent the 95%
and 99% level of the corresponding risk measure estimate for a German zero coupon bond.
We observe that both the VaRα and the ESα of ESBies with κ ≥ 0.2 are considerably smaller
than the German benchmark. We conclude that, from the viewpoint of a standard market risk
analysis, ESBies appear safe and that very low risk capital levels are required to back these
products. This observation is fully in line with the market risk analysis of de Sola Perea et al.
(2019), who find that “(spread changes for) senior tranches have low tail risk exposure, often
lower than the tail risk of lowest-risk euro area sovereigns.” This coincidence is interesting since
the analysis of de Sola Perea et al. (2019) uses a completely different methodology, namely a
time-series approach based on GARCH models and a VAR for VaR analysis.
21
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.25 0.30 0.35
0.
05
0.
10
0.
20
0.
50
1.
00
threshold
%
D
EU
 (9
5%
)
D
EU
 (9
9%
)
l 99%
95%
3 Months Value at Risk
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.25 0.30 0.35
0.
05
0.
10
0.
20
0.
50
1.
00
threshold
%
D
EU
 (9
5%
)
D
EU
 (9
9%
)
l 99%
95%
3 Months Expected Shortfall
Dynamic Risk Analysis
(2018−09−03)
Figure 8: Risk measure estimates VaRα (left) and ESα (right) for the three-month distribution of
negative ESB-returns for different κ and confidence levels α ∈ {0.95, 0.99}. Note that risk measures are
given in percent and that the plot uses a logarithmic scale on the y-axis.
5 Summary and Policy Implications
We draw the following key conclusions from the risk analysis of ESBies and PSNTs. Both the
static risk analysis of Section 4.2 and the investigation of the loss distribution in Section 4.6
suggest that, in normal circumstances, diversification works and ESBies with κ > 0.25 are
indeed very safe products.18 In line with this finding, we showed that the weak link approach
for the rating of ESBies proposed by S&P is extremely conservative as it corresponds to a
worst-case default scenario. We have also seen that for typical parameter values, the spread
and the loss probability of ESBies are substantially lower than those of PSNTs (securities
created by pooling the senior tranche of national debt). Moreover, for PSNTs, spread and loss
probability are more sensitive to changes in the LGD distribution than for ESBies. This shows
that from a risk perspective ESBies might be preferable to PSNTs.
However, considering solely the results of Section 4.2 and Section 4.6 could lead to an overly
optimistic picture. The analysis of credit spread trajectories in Section 4.3 and the scenario
based analysis of Section 4.4 show that the attachment point κ needs to be chosen more
conservatively in order to make ESBies robust with respect to fluctuations in the underlying
risk factors or to changes in the market perception of default dependence. In fact, one has
to take attachment points κ > 0.35 for ESBies to be safe even in very adverse scenarios.
Moreover, ESBies are most likely to generate large market losses in the aftermath of severe
economic shocks and in contagion scenarios.
From a policy perspective, it is therefore important that a large-scale introduction of ESBies
is accompanied by appropriate policy measures to limit the economic implications of external
18In fact, from the perspective of an expected loss analysis, already an attachment point κ = 0.15 might
suffice to make ESBies safe.
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shocks and default events in the euro area (and thus default contagion). Such measures
include a substantial weakening of the sovereign-bank nexus; a completion of the banking and
capital markets union and the creation of a European deposit insurance scheme to improve
risk sharing; more flexible forms of ESM (European Stability Mechanism) lending to countries
in financial difficulties and bond clauses to allow for an orderly restructuring of sovereign debt
and a bail-in of private investors, and perhaps even limited direct transfers to countries hit
by severe economic shocks, see Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2018) for details. In conjunction with
these measures, the introduction of ESBies would be a useful step in improving the financial
architecture of the euro area.
A Pricing methodology
Our main tool for computing prices of credit derivatives is the following extended Laplace
transform for Markov modulated CIR processes. A related result was derived in Elliott and
Siu (2009) for the case a single CIR-type process, see also van Beek et al. (2020)
Proposition A.1. Denote by F = (Ft)t≥0 the filtration generated by the Brownian motion W
and the Markov chain X. Consider vectors a,u ∈ RJ+ and a function ξ : SX → R. Fix some
horizon date s ≤ T . Then it holds that for 0 ≤ t < s
E
(
ξ(Xs) exp
(
−
∫ s
t
a′γθdθ
)
e−u
′γs | Ft
)
= v(t,Xt) exp
(
β(s− t,u)′γt
)
. (A.1)
Here β(·,u) = (β1(·,u), . . . , βJ(·,u))′ and the functions βj(·,u), 1 ≤ j ≤ J , solve the Riccati
equation
∂tβj(t,u) = −κjβj(t,u) + 1
2
(σj)2β2j (t,u)− aj , 0 < t ≤ s , (A.2)
with initial condition β(0,u) = −u. Moreover, with v(t) = (v(t, 1), . . . , v(t,K))′, the function
v : [0, s]× SX → R satisfies the linear ODE system
− d
dt
v(t)− diag (µ¯1(t), . . . , µ¯K(t))v(t) = Qv(t), on [0, s], (A.3)
with terminal condition v(s) = ξ and with µ¯k(t) =
∑J
j=1 e
ωjtκjµj(k)βj(s− t,u).
The functions βj(t,u) are known explicitly, see for instance Filipovic (2009) for details.
Essentially, Proposition A.1 shows that computing the extended Laplace transform of γ is
not much more complicated than in the classical case of independent CIR processes; the only
additional step is to solve the K-dimensional linear ODE system (A.3) for the function v(t),
which is straightforward to do numerically.
Proof. We start by conditioning in (A.1) on Ft∨FX∞. Due to the independence of the Brownian
motions W 1, . . . ,W J , we have conditional independence of γ1, . . . , γJ given FX∞, which in turn
leads to
E
(
ξ(Xs) exp
(
−
∫ s
t
a′γθdθ
)
e−u
′γs | Ft ∨ FX∞
)
= ξ(Xs)
J∏
j=1
E
(
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
ajγ
j
θdθ
)
e−ujγ
j
s | Ft ∨ FX∞
)
. (A.4)
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Conditional on FX∞, the hazard rates γj are time-inhomogeneous affine diffusions. Standard
references on affine models, such as Duffie, Pan and Singleton (2000), consequently give that
E
(
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
ajγ
j
θdθ
)
e−ujγ
j
s | Ft ∨ FX∞
)
= exp
(
αj(t, s ; X) + βj(s− t,u)γjt
)
, (A.5)
where βj solves (A.2) and where
d
dtαj(t, s ;X) = −eω
jtκjµj(Xt)βj(s− t) and αj(s, s ;X) = 0;
see for instance Duffie et al. (2000) or Section 10.6 of McNeil et al. (2015) for a proof. Integra-
tion thus gives αj(t, s ;X) =
∫ s
t e
ωjθκjµj(Xθ)βj(s− θ)dθ. By iterated conditional expectation,
we hence get
E
(
ξ(Xs) exp
(
−
∫ s
t
a′γθdθ
)
e−u
′γs | Ft
)
= exp
( J∑
j=1
βj(s− t)γjt
)
E
(
ξ(Xs) exp
(∫ s
t
µ¯Xθ(θ)dθ
)
| Ft
)
The Feynman Kac formula for functions of the Markov chain X finally gives that
E
(
ξ(Xs) exp
(∫ s
t
µ¯Xθ(θ)dθ
)
| Ft
)
= v(t,Xt),
and hence the result.
Next we consider the pricing of a survival claim and of a CDS on sovereign j.
Survival claim. The payoff of a survival claim on sovereign j with maturity date s and
payoff function f : SX → R is of the form 1{τ j>s}f(Xs). Using standard results on doubly
stochastic default times, the price of this claim at time t ≤ s is
E
(
B−1t,s 1{τ j>s}f(Xs) | Gt
)
= 1{τ j>t}B
−1
t,s E
(
e−
∫ s
t γ
j
sdsf(Xs) | Ft
)
,
and the expectation on the right can be computed from Proposition A.1 with a = ej , u = 0
and ξ = f .
Credit default swap. We briefly discuss CDS pricing in our setup, since this is crucial
for model calibration. From the payoff description (2.4), pricing a CDS contract amounts to
computing the conditional expectation
E
(
N∑
n=1
B−1t,tn1{τj∈(tn−1,tn]}δ
j
tn −
N∑
n=1
x(tn − tn−1)B−1t,tn1{τj>tn} | Gt
)
. (A.6)
Denote by V premt and V
def
t the present value of the premium and the default leg, that is
V premt (x) =
N∑
n=1
B−1t,tnx(tn − tn−1)E
(
1{τj>tn} | Gt
)
,
V deft =
N∑
n=1
B−1t,tnE
(
1{τj∈(tn−1,tn]}δ
j
tn) | Gt
)
=
N∑
n=1
B−1t,tnE
(
1{τj∈(tn−1,tn]}δ
j(Xtn) | Gt
)
. (A.7)
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To obtain (A.7), we have used the fact that the default leg of the CDS is linear in the loss
given default, so that we can replace δjtn with its conditional expectation. The premium leg
is simply the sum of survival claims. The evaluation of (A.7) is more involved, and we now
show how this can be achieved via Proposition A.1. Fix any two consecutive payment dates
tn−1, tn of T and assume w.l.o.g. that t ≤ tn−1. Since 1{tn−1<τ j≤tn} = 1{τ j>tn−1} − 1{τ j>tn},
we can write the term E
(
1{τj∈(tn−1,tn]}δj(Xtn) | Gt
)
in the form
E
(
1{τ j>tn−1}δ
j(Xtn) | Gt
)− E (1{τ j>tn}δj(Xtn) | Gt) . (A.8)
The second term in (A.8) is a survival claim. By iterated conditional expectations, we get that
the first term is equal to
E
(
1{τ j>tn−1}E
(
δj(Xtn) | Gtn−1
) | Gt) . (A.9)
Since X is Markov, it holds that E
(
δj(Xtn) | Gtn−1
)
= vδ(tn−1, Xtn−1) for a suitable function
vδ : [0, tn]×SX → R (given by the solution of an ODE system), so (A.9) reduces to computing
E
(
1{τ j>tn−1}v
δ(tn−1, Xtn−1) | Gt
)
, which is a standard pricing problem for a survival claim.
Finally, we turn to the pricing of ESBies. In order to evaluate the function hEJB,κ
we use Monte Carlo simulation. For the computation of the function hESB,κ we use that
hESB,κ = E
(
B−1t,T (1− LT ) | Gt
)
− hEJB,κ and we compute the expected discounted portfolio
loss analytically.
B Worst-case default scenario and price bounds
In this section we provide some additional results underpinning our discussion of the worst-case
default scenario and lower price bounds for ESBies in Section 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. By the put call parity (2.7) for ESBies and EJBies, the claim of
the proposition is equivalent to showing that L∗ maximizes the value of EJBies. More precisely,
we show that for any random vector (L1, . . . , LJ)′ ∈ [0, 1]J with E(Lj) = ¯`j , 1 ≤ j ≤ J , and
any κ > 0, it holds that
E
(( J∑
j=1
wjLj − κ)+) ≤ E(( J∑
j=1
wjL∗j − κ
)+)
. (B.1)
We may use call options instead of put options in (B.1) since E(
∑J
j=1w
jLj) is fixed. To
establish the inequality (B.1) we use a result on stochastic orders from Ba¨uerle and Mu¨ller
(2006). According to the equivalence ((iii) ⇔ (iv)) in Theorem 2.2 of that paper, (B.1) is
equivalent to the inequality
ESα
( J∑
i=1
wjLj
)
≤ ESα
( J∑
i=1
wjL∗j
)
for all α ∈ [0, 1) , (B.2)
where for a generic random variable Z, ESα(Z) =
1
1−α
∫ 1
α qu(Z) du gives the expected shortfall
of Z at confidence level α and where qu(Z) denotes the quantile of Z at level u.
To establish (B.2) we show first that L∗j maximizes the quantity ESα(L
j) over all rvs Lj
with value in the interval [0, 1] and expectation E(Lj) = ¯`j , simultaneously for all α ∈ [0, 1).
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In fact, the random variable Lj has to satisfy the constraints qu(L
j) ≤ 1 (since Lj ∈ [0, 1])
and
∫ 1
0 qu(L
j) du = ¯`j (since E(Lj) = ¯`j , so that
ESα(L
j) ≤ 1
1− α min{1− α,
¯`j} = ESα(L∗j ) .
Moreover, we get from the coherence of expected shortfall that
ESα
( J∑
j=1
wjLj
)
≤
J∑
j=1
wjESα
(
Lj
) ≤ J∑
j=1
wjESα
(
L∗j
)
= ESα
( J∑
j=1
wjL∗j
)
,
where the last equality follows since L∗1, . . . , L∗m are comonotonic. This gives inequality (B.2)
and hence the result.
Distribution of L∗. Next we discuss properties of the distribution pi∗ of the worst-case
default scenario. This distribution is a discrete probability measure on [0, 1]m which charges
J + 1 points; it is given by
pi∗
(
(1, . . . , 1)
)
= ¯`1, pi∗
(
(0, 1, . . . , 1)
)
= ¯`2 − ¯`1, · · · , pi∗((0, . . . , 0, 1)) = ¯`J − ¯`J−1,
pi∗
(
(0, . . . , 0)
)
= 1− ¯`J .
We call pi∗ the worst-case distribution. Note that, under pi∗, the probability of large default
“clusters” is maximal given the expected loss constraints. First, under pi∗ the event where all
sovereigns default has probability ¯`1. Since
Q(L1 = · · · = LJ = 1) ≤ Q(L1 = 1) ≤ E(L1) = ¯`1 ,
this is the maximum value possible. Next, under pi∗ the default scenario where all sovereigns
except the first default has probability ¯`2 − ¯`1. It is easily seen that this is the maximum
possible value given the expected-loss constraints and the probability attributed to the first
cluster (the cluster where all sovereigns default). Similarly, the probability of the (n + 1)-th
cluster, where all but the first n sovereigns default, is maximal given the probability attributed
to the first n clusters.
Finally we sketch an approach for the approximation of the worst-case distribution pi∗
within our model. Note first that, for κj large and σj small, the hazard-rate trajectory (γjt )0 is
essentially determined by the trajectory ofX and by the choice of the mean reversion level µj(·),
so that we concentrate on these quantities. We consider a model with K = J + 1 states of X
that correspond to the different default “clusters” under pi∗. Choose some large n and define the
mean reversion level µj(·) by µ1(1) = · · · = µJ(1) = 1n ; µ1(2) = · · · = µJ−1(2) = 1n , µJ(2) = n;
. . . ; µ1(J + 1) = · · · = µJ(J + 1) = n. Note that in state k the default probability of obligor
1 to obligor J − k + 1 is small, the default probability of obligor J + 2− k up to obligor J is
large; that is, the state corresponds to the (J + 2− k)-th default cluster.
Next we define the generator matrix of X. We assume that states 2 to J+1 are absorbing,
so that qik = 0 for 2 ≤ i ≤ J + 1 and all k. Define probabilities p1, . . . , pJ+1 by p1 = 1 − l¯J ,
pk = ¯`
J+2−k − ¯`J+1−k for 2 ≤ k ≤ J , and finally pJ+1 = ¯`1, that is pk corresponds to the
probability of the (J+2−k)-th default cluster under pi∗. Since states 2, . . . , J+1 are absorbing,
we get for any valid choice for the first row of Q that Q(XT = 1) = eq11T and
Q(XT = k) = (1− eq11T ) q1k−q11 , k = 2, . . . , J + 1 ,
26
(recall q11 = −
∑J+1
k=2 q1k). We want to choose q12, . . . , q1J+1 so that Q(XT = k) = pk for all
k. This gives
q11 =
1
T
ln p1 and q1k = −pk q11
1− p1 , k = 2, . . . , J + 1 . (B.3)
Since
∑J+1
k=1 pk = 1, we get that q11 = −
∑K+1
k=2 q1k so that (B.3) defines indeed a valid generator
matrix. Moreover, for n→∞, κj →∞ and σj → 0,
Q
(
1{τ1≤T} = · · · = 1{τJ−k+1≤T} = 0,1{τJ−k+2≤T} = · · · = 1{τJ≤T} = 1
)
converges to Q(XT = k) = pk which gives the result by definition of the pk.
C Details on Calibration
C.1 Data
In Table 4 below we present summary statistics of the data we use in the model calibration.
Yrs. AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA IRL ITA NLD PRT
AA AA AAA A AA AA A BBB AAA BBB
Panel A: Mean
1 31.071 44.063 12.819 113.637 13.273 26.590 204.380 115.934 20.269 307.199
2 38.341 54.593 16.700 138.474 17.780 35.106 220.752 143.971 25.232 346.413
3 45.016 66.843 21.918 153.769 22.148 44.961 224.791 165.881 30.413 352.693
4 54.657 77.339 29.151 165.480 28.219 56.684 223.055 181.786 38.267 354.438
5 61.675 85.437 34.562 174.373 33.048 65.906 222.409 193.090 43.902 359.586
Panel B: Standard Deviation
1 38.589 59.330 12.418 113.398 12.932 30.303 309.597 110.190 21.720 436.057
2 42.347 67.134 14.520 129.415 14.257 34.529 308.774 113.689 23.782 449.052
3 44.800 74.987 17.157 131.520 15.065 39.920 293.590 115.705 24.563 399.150
4 48.974 76.066 21.330 130.483 16.769 45.769 264.432 113.967 27.595 352.837
5 51.023 76.099 24.114 129.470 17.407 49.149 244.132 112.625 29.439 324.968
Panel C: Minimum
1 4.080 3.840 2.920 10.450 2.250 3.550 7.830 21.620 3.120 12.480
2 6.190 7.020 3.980 18.900 3.800 6.570 12.330 33.880 4.840 28.670
3 7.820 9.430 6.230 25.050 6.040 9.620 15.860 48.990 7.230 40.650
4 9.890 11.910 8.330 30.730 10.290 12.630 19.670 56.490 9.140 47.110
5 13.270 16.480 9.510 37.230 13.020 17.400 23.970 59.830 11.240 47.230
Panel D: Maximum
1 259.960 301.620 74.840 489.430 66.530 160.660 1629.340 619.540 110.870 2598.930
2 267.440 337.600 81.080 608.330 74.600 177.440 1614.480 591.030 125.040 2494.690
3 269.490 375.700 90.350 619.920 82.550 198.200 1572.800 581.050 130.650 2102.190
4 271.430 379.090 108.250 622.220 90.460 222.510 1419.750 575.930 132.710 1846.700
5 272.180 380.940 119.060 624.290 95.000 237.300 1318.590 573.030 136.960 1802.360
Table 4: Summary statistics of CDS spreads (in bp).
C.2 Methodology
In order to determine the parameters (Θj , σj), 1 ≤ j ≤ J , the generator matrix Q and
the realised trajectories {γsm} and {Xsm}, we use an iterative approach which is compactly
summarized in Algorithm 1 below. We set Θ = (Θ1, . . . ,ΘJ) and we use {γtm}(i), {Xtm}(i)
and (Θj)(i) to denote the i-th estimate of the distinct variables within the iteration.
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Algorithm 1: Detailed description of calibration step
Data: Market CDS spreads for maturities u ∈ T for each sovereign 1 ≤ j ≤ J
Result: Estimates for {γsm}, {Xsm} and Θ
1 Initialization for {γsm}(0), {Xsm}(0), (Θ)(0) and Q(0)
2 i = 0
3 while
∑J
j=1
∑M
m=0 l
j
(
(γjsm)
(i), (Θj)(i), (σj)(i), Q(i), X
(i)
sm
)
≥  do
4 for j ← 1 to J do
5 for m← 0 to M do
6 (γjsm)
(i+1) = arg minγ l
j
sm(γ, (Θ
j)(i), (σj)(i), Q(i), X
(i)
sm)
7 end
8 Estimate (σj)(i+1) based on the quadratic variation of (γj)(i+1)
9 end
10 for m← 0 to M do
11 X
(i+1)
sm = arg minx
∑J
j=1 l
j
sm
(
(γjsm)
(i+1), (Θj)(i), (σj)(i+1), Q(i), x)
)
12 end
13 Estimate Q(i+1) via MLE based on X(i+1)
14 for j ← 1 to J do
15 (Θj)(i+1) = arg minΘ
∑M
m=0 l
j
sm
(
(γjsm)
(i+1),Θ, (σj)(i+1), Q(i+1)X
(i+1)
sm )
)
16 end
17 Set i← i+ 1
18 end
The assumption of conditionally independent defaults substantially facilitates the calibra-
tion procedure: given an estimate for Q and {Xsm}, estimation of {γjtm} and of the parameter
vector Θj can be done independently for each sovereign j. We initiate the calibration by
applying k-means clustering on the relevant CDS spreads to get an estimate for X(0). For
small maturities T , it holds that ĉds
j
T ≈ δj(X)γj . We use this approximation along with the
initial estimate X(0) to get an estimate for (γj)(0) and we consequently solve the optimization
problem of line 15 in Algorithm 1 to obtain the initial value Θ(0). To compute the estimates
for σj , we use that the quadratic variation of γj satisfies
[γj , γj ]t = (σ
j)2
∫ t
0
γjsds,
and we approximate the integral with Riemann sums. For a given (estimated) realisation of
the Markov chain, we use the standard MLE estimator for continuous-time Markov chains to
get an estimate of Q.
The main numerical challenge in the application of Algorithm 1 is to solve the optimization
problem
min
Θ
M∑
m=0
lj
(
(γjsm)
(i+1),Θ, (σj)(i+1), Q,X(i+1)sm )
)
. (C.1)
We impose the restriction that all parameters are non-negative and, for regularization purposes,
we set the lower bound of the mean-reversion speed κj to 0.1 for all j. During the first
iteration of Algorithm 1, we employ an algorithm for constrained optimization as presented
in Runarsson and Yao (2005). The algorithm uses heuristics to escape local optima. In order
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to refine the estimation, in the subsequent calibration steps (i.e. for steps i > 1) we use the
local optimizer of Powell (1994), which provides a derivative-free optimization method based
on linear approximations of the target function. After successful convergence of Algorithm 1,
we perform a final refinement step in which we keep all input variables except Θj , 1 ≤ j ≤ J ,
fixed.
C.3 Results
State AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA IRL ITA NLD PRT
1 0.55 0.55 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.55
2 0.55 0.55 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.55
3 0.65 0.65 0.60 0.65 0.60 0.60 0.65 0.60 0.60 0.65
Table 5: Fixed conditional means of LGDs for different sovereigns and varying states.
The following figure illustrates the quality of the model fit for two different sovereigns.
C.4 Parameters used in Risk Analysis
AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA IRL ITA NLD PRT
0.04 0.04 0.29 0.12 0.02 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.07 0.01
Table 6: Portfolio weights of ESBies and EJBies, based on proportion of sovereigns on euro area GDP
as of 2018.
Q˜1 Q˜2
State 1 State 2 State 3 State 1 State 2 State 3
State 1 (expansion) −0.1421 0.1421 0.0000 −0.1421 0.1421 0.0000
State 2 (mild recession) 0.5843 −0.8685 0.2843 0.5843 −0.7685 0.1843
State 3 (strong recession) 0.0000 1.4444 −1.4444 0.0000 1.4444 −1.4444
Table 7: Generator matrices Q˜1 and Q˜2 for crisis scenarios.
C.5 Results of EM Estimation
Param. AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA IRL ITA NLD PRT
µ(1) 0.0023 0.0016 0.0012 0.0013 0.0029 0.0220 0.0329 0.0095 0.0136 0.0027
µ(2) 0.0103 0.0054 0.0013 0.0016 0.0196 0.1391 0.1375 0.0408 0.1231 0.0099
µ(3) 0.0144 0.0120 0.0116 0.0080 0.0346 0.1219 0.0941 0.0698 0.1245 0.0192
κ 6.9584 6.2427 3.1193 6.3241 5.5822 3.4718 1.5879 3.2518 2.0640 8.4694
Table 8: Estimation results: parameters of hazard rate dynamics.
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Figure 9: Time series plots of market CDS spreads against model values. The solid (dashed) lines
correspond to the market (model) values of the distinct CDS spreads.
State 1 State 2 State 3
State 1 (expansion) −0.9033 0.9033 0.0000
State 2 (mild recession) 5.9877 −10.4716 4.4839
State 3 (strong recession) 4.3316 1.8569 −6.1885
Table 9: Estimation results: generator matrix Q of X.
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